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The paper analyzes the effect of transaction costs on social learning in an asset market with asymmetric 
information, sequential trading and a competitive price mechanism. Both fixed and proportional transaction costs 
reduce the information content of trading orders and lead to informational cascades. If transaction costs are very 
high, an informational cascade may occur not only when beliefs converge on a specific asset value, but also 
when there is absolute uncertainty about the asset's fundamental value. Finally, if the value in the bad state is 
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   1 Introduction
Both market practitioners and academic economists have recently shown renewed interest in
herd behavior in ￿nancial markets. 1 Much of the literature on market microstructure holds
that when agents are asymmetrically informed and trades occur sequentially, the market
should gradually learn the fundamental information possessed by market participants, so
that prices should eventually converge to fundamental values. 2 In the long run, therefore,
asset markets are viewed as informationally e￿cient. 3 However, many interesting regularities
observed in capital markets are not easily addressed under the e￿cient-markets hypothesis.
Many of them can be explained by herd behavior. 4 For example, the empirical evidence
on episodes of soaring prices and subsequent collapse, like the Dutch Tulip Mania in the
seventeenth century, the stock market crashes of 1929 and 1987 and, more recently, the
international ￿nancial crisis in southeast Asia in 1997-8 and the overpricing of US technology
stocks in the late 1990s, would be consistent with short-run mispricing caused by rational
herd behavior.5 Also, the recurrent high volatility of ￿nancial market prices even in the
absence of justifying news could be the consequence of information aggregation failure due
to herding.6
Originally, imitative behavior was not considered rational: herds were described as peo-
ple blindly following others.7 More recently, however, the literature on social learning has
reconciled herd behavior with rationality in many economic environments. 8 The models of in-
formational cascades { that is, situations where imitative behavior leads market participants
to disregard completely their own private information { belong to this strand of literature on
\rational herding".9
This paper contributes to the analysis of rational herding in ￿nancial markets, inquir-
ing into the existence and the empirical implications of informational cascades arising from
transaction costs in stock markets with asymmetric information, sequential trading and a
competitive price mechanism.
Standard models of informational cascades apply to environments where prices are ex-
ogenous. So they hardly apply to asset markets, where prices adjust continuously to re￿ect
the changing information revealed by orders and trades. 10 One may imagine that this in-
formational role of prices would eliminate the tendency of agents to herd, that is, to trust
1See Hirshleifer and Teoh [13] for a survey on the theoretical and empirical literature on herd behavior in capital markets.
2See Glosten and Milgrom [12], Kyle [15].
3Informational e￿ciency refers to how much information is revealed by the price process. This is important in economies
where information is dispersed among many individuals. Prices are information e￿cient if they fully and correctly re￿ect the
relevant information (Fama, [10]). If prices do not correctly and fully re￿ect public information, then there would be a pro￿table
trading opportunity for individuals. In general, this is ruled out in models with rational utility-maximizing agents.
4See Kortian [14] for an extensive review of recent theoretical literature on asset price formation and capital market behavior.
5See Avery and Zemsky [2].
6See Lee [16].
7For references to irrational herding see Devenow and Welch [9].
8See Chamley [5] for a thorough analysis of the causes of rational herds.
9The term "informational cascade" was introduced by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [4] to describe a situation in which,
in a sequential trade framework, every agent, based on the observation of previous agents, makes the same choice independent of
his private information. Banerjee [3] also wrote another paper on rational imitative behavior due to informational externalities.
10Avery and Zemsky [2] prove that, in the standard Glosten-Milgrom framework, the competitive price mechanism prevents
informational cascades.
1the quantity signals issued by other market participants. But some recent theoretical mod-
els have shown that herding { and in some cases informational cascades { may arise even
in ￿nancial markets. The situations in which this may occur include (i) multidimensional
uncertainty, (ii) reputational concerns of asset managers, (iii) heterogeneous preferences of
market participants, and (iv) transaction costs. The present model is predicated on the last
assumption, as we shall see below.
Multidimensional uncertainty and, more generally, non-monotonic signals open the pos-
sibility of herd behavior and short-run mispricing of assets, as shown by Avery and Zemsky
[2]. Intuitively, when traders observe multidimensional signals the market price, being a one-
dimensional variable, is unable to convey all their information to other market participants.
Since market makers and informed traders interpret the history of trades di￿erently, this
model generates short-run mispricing, though not informational cascades: herding does not
stem altogether the ￿ow of information in the market, so that it does not prevent prices from
converging to fundamental values. However, Gervais [11] shows that uncertainty about the
precision of investors’ private signals can lead to complete information blockage.
Herding in ￿nancial markets may also arise from reputational concerns of asset managers,
in the context of a principal-agent relationship with investors, as ￿rst shown by Scharfstein
and Stein [18]. Dasgupta and Prat [7] examine the e￿ect of reputational concerns on the
informational e￿ciency of prices in asset markets ￿ a la Glosten and Milgrom. In a standard
sequential trading model with managers who trade on behalf of other investors, they show
that if institutional traders care about their reputation for ability, the market is information-
ally ine￿cient and there is an incentive for conformism.
Informational cascades may arise in asset markets also as a result of the heterogeneous
preferences of market participants. Decamps and Lovo [8] show that they may develop if
informed traders are risk-averse and market makers risk-neutral, assuming that there is a ￿oor
and a ceiling to the trade size per period. An informational cascade occurs because as prices
become more informative, the traders’ informational advantage vanishes and orders only
re￿ect the inventory imbalance. Cipriani and Guarino [6] reach similar results considering
heterogeneous traders in a multiple security setting, ￿nding that informational cascades can
also lead to contagion across markets.
Finally, trading frictions in price formation may induce informational cascades insofar as
they deter informed market participants to place orders. Lee [16] shows that, in a stock
market with ￿xed transaction costs and sequential trading, the market may fail to aggregate
information, and partial or total informational cascades may occur. However, in his frame-
work the market maker is not a fully rational intermediary. At each trading round, he is
assumed to set the price equal to the expected asset value conditional on the history of past
trades, rather than setting bid and ask prices so as to compete for incoming orders. Indeed,
since his prices do not condition on the information conveyed by the order ￿ow, he makes
losses on average.
The ￿rst question that the present paper addresses is whether Lee’s insights on informa-
tional cascades in ￿nancial markets with transaction costs are robust to the introduction
2of competitive and pro￿t maximizing market makers, that is, to full modelling of the price
mechanism. Second, while Lee’s model predicts that informational cascades occur as public
beliefs concentrate at the tails of the asset value distribution, it is worthwhile to ask if they
may occur also if the market is completely uncertain about the fundamental value. Finally,
I shall investigate if in such a model herding is more often associated with crashes than with
frenzies. One of the main purposes of models on herd behavior is to explain the empirical
evidence of ￿nancial bubbles and crashes, which are not fully addressed in standard asset
pricing models. But these models have no apparent bias for crashes: herd behavior can just
as easily generate frenzies, in contrast with the empirical evidence that frenzies are much less
common than crashes.
The paper addresses these issues in a stock market economy ￿ a la Glosten and Milgrom,
where sequential trades for a single risky asset are channelled through risk-neutral market
makers who set competitive prices. Some traders have better information about the asset’s
fundamental value and trade so as to exploit this edge; the others are uninformed and trade
for exogenous reasons. A key assumption is that market makers bear an exogenous cost for
executing orders.
I show that when market makers bear a ￿xed cost per transaction, the market is not
informationally e￿cient. That is, the competitive price mechanism cannot prevent the oc-
currence of informational cascades. Further, in tune with the ￿nding of Lee [16], during the
informational cascade no informed traders will trade. Equilibrium bid and ask prices can
be decomposed into two components: expectations of the asset’s value, given all relevant
public information, and the exogenous transaction cost. The informational advantage of
traders is the di￿erence between the expected value conditional on their private signal and
the expected asset value for market makers. As the price becomes a more precise estimate of
fundamental value, the di￿erence shrinks. Before the uncertainty about fundamental value
is completely resolved, informed traders stop trading because their informational advantage
is smaller than the ￿xed transaction cost. From then on, no new information reaches the
market, so prices stay constant and the bid-ask spread narrows, because the adverse selection
component disappears.
The model predicts a positive correlation between bid-ask spreads and informed trading
volume. This is because traders getting private signals with moderate information content
assign a large weight to previous price history. So before a cascade develops the traders with
less informative signals refrain from trading because of transaction costs, orders become less
informative, and the spread gradually narrows.
Moreover, if transaction costs are high enough, an informational cascade may occur even
when the market is totally uncertain about the fundamental value. High transaction costs
mean that traders observing a \bearish" signal will sell only when the bid price is high
enough and those observing a \bullish" signal will buy only when the ask price is low enough.
Equilibrium prices are low if the market attaches a high probability to the low value, high in
the opposite case. When the market is completely uncertain, prices are in the middle of their
distribution and in equilibrium no informed trader chooses to trade. This result runs counter
3to the previous literature, which holds that cascades develop when there is a convergence of
beliefs.
Finally, I extend the analysis to include the case of proportional { rather than ￿xed
{ transaction costs. In this setting, if the fundamental value in the bad state of nature
is su￿ciently low, then the probability of an informational cascade when prices are low
approaches zero. The impact of proportional transaction costs on the expected pro￿ts of
informed traders decreases as prices fall and tends to zero if the asset value in the bad state
of nature is close to zero. This result has the interesting implication that cascades will be
asymmetrical. They will emerge seldom in depressed markets, more often in bull markets.
As a consequence, they are more likely to result in crashes than in manias.
The paper proceeds as follows. The basic model with ￿xed transaction costs is presented
in section 2. Section 3 de￿nes and derives the market equilibrium. Section 4 demonstrates the
occurrence of informational cascades, and section 5 analyzes the market equilibrium before
and during a cascade. The case of proportional transaction costs is examined in section 6.
Finally, section 7 explores some extensions and concludes. Proofs of propositions, corollaries
and lemmas are given in the appendix.
2 Trading mechanism and information structure
We take a sequential trade model similar to Glosten and Milgrom’s [12], with a single risky
asset whose value e V depends on the state of nature. If the state is good, the value is V ; if
bad, V , with V > V ￿ 0. We assume that the initial prior probability ￿0 = P(V ) of the high
value is non-degenerate, that is, ￿0 2 (0; 1). There are traders and market makers. Trades
are sequential, and at any given point in the time, only one trader is allowed to transact.
Before a trader arrives, market makers simultaneously announce their bid and ask prices.
We assume that market makers are risk-neutral and act competitively. We further suppose
that they bear an exogenous transaction cost c.11 The trader arriving in the market observes
the prices and has the option of selling or buying one unit of the asset at the best prices
or refraining from trading. Once he has had the opportunity to trade, the trader leaves the
market. He may trade further, but only after returning to the pool of traders and being
selected again.12
A fraction ￿ of traders are uninformed liquidity traders while 1 ￿ ￿ are informed.13 Liq-
uidity traders trade for reasons exogenous to the model. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that they choose to sell, buy, or refrain from trading with equal probability. 14 Informed
11The cost c represents all transaction costs unrelated to the underlying value of the stock, and includes clearing and settlement
fees.
12As usual in models ￿ a la Glosten and Milgrom [12], we make the simplifying assumption of ￿xed trade size equal to one unit
of asset. The analysis would be totally una￿ected by the normalization if transaction costs were proportional to the quantity
traded (not its value). Moreover, it can be shown that the results on informational cascades are robust with respect to the
hypothesis of di￿erent order sizes.
13Liquidity traders are needed to guarantee that trading occurs. In the absence of traders who trade for reasons other than
speculation, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey [17] applies and the market breaks down.
14In Glosten and Milgrom [12], liquidity traders trade as long as the reservation value dictated by their liquidity needs exceeds
the ask (bid) price for the buy (sell) order. As a consequence, if there are too many informed traders, then the market maker
may have to set a spread so large as to preclude any trading at all. In order to avoid market collapse, we assume that the
4traders are risk-neutral, price-taking agents 15 who privately observe a signal ￿ correlated
with the value of the asset. They trade to maximize their expected pro￿t. We denote as
￿ = f￿1; ￿2;:::; ￿Ng the set of private signals, and assume that these are conditionally
independent and satisfy the monotone likelihood property:
0 < ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿￿￿ < 1 < ￿￿￿ < ￿N￿1 < ￿N < 1
where ￿n = P(￿nje V = V )=P(￿nje V = V ).
The signal ￿n is \good" if the probability of observing ￿n when the true asset value is V
exceeds that probability conditional on V , that is ￿n < 1. In the opposite case it is \bad".
It is easy to see that a good signal is more informative when ￿ is lower, a bad signal
when ￿ is higher. The information content of a good and a bad signal, ￿i and ￿j, are equal
if ￿j = 1=￿i. For simplicity, we assume that good and bad signals are symmetrical, that is
￿1 = 1=￿N, ￿2 = 1=￿N￿1, and so on.
Both market makers and traders are Bayesian agents who know the structure of the
market. We denote by ￿t the probability of V conditional on the publicly observable history
of trades up to time t. Thus, the public belief about the asset value at t is:
Et[e V ] = ￿t ￿ V + (1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ V = V + ￿t ￿ (V ￿ V )
3 Equilibrium
Before each trading round market makers set their prices. Bertrand competition and risk
neutrality lead market makers to earn zero expected pro￿t for every possible trade.
After prices are set, a trader is randomly selected to trade. He can place a sell order ( s)
at the highest bid price, Bt, place a buy order (b) at the lowest ask price, At, or refrain from
trading (r). We denote by A ￿ fs; b; r g the traders’ action space.
With probability ￿ the trader selected will be uninformed; with probability 1 ￿￿, informed.
Agents do not observe the type of trader.
Uninformed traders trade for exogenous reasons and submit orders in the probabilistic
way speci￿ed above. Informed traders observe the prices quoted and choose the strategy
that maximizes expected pro￿t. We denote by ￿ ￿ f￿￿g￿2￿ the informed traders’ strategies,
where ￿￿ is the mixed strategy of the informed trader if he observes ￿. Clearly:
￿￿ ￿ (￿￿;s; ￿￿;b; ￿￿;r)
probability that liquidity traders buy and sell in each period is su￿ciently high and is stationary.
15This assumption rules out their strategic behavior. It is reasonable given that there is an in￿nite number of informed traders
in the pool and for each of them the probability of trading again is zero.
5where ￿￿;i is the probability of i, with i 2 A, if the trader observes ￿, ￿i2A ￿￿;i = 1, and
￿￿;i ￿ 0 8i 2 A.
The expected pro￿t of a market maker is equal to Et[e V jsatB] ￿ B ￿ c, if he buys at B,
and it is equal to A￿Et[e V jbatA]￿c, if he sells at A. The expected pro￿t of a trader getting
signal ￿, when the price schedule is P = fB; Ag and he plays the strategy ￿ 2 ￿(A), is
Et[￿￿(￿jP)] = ￿￿;s(B ￿ Et[e V j￿]) + ￿￿;b(Et[e V j￿] ￿ A).
Assuming that market makers act competitively and that for each informed trader the
probability of trading again is zero rules out all intertemporal strategic behavior. Therefore,
each trading round can be viewed as a single two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage market makers
set their prices, and in the second the trader observes the quotes and plays his strategy. What
we are concerned with here is the Nash equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 At each trading round t, the equilibrium in the asset market consists of a trading
strategy correspondence ￿￿
￿(Pjt) : R2






￿(Pjt) = argmax￿2￿(A) Et[￿￿(￿jP)]; 8P 2 R2
+; 8￿ 2 ￿
2. B￿
t 2 Et[e V jsatB￿
t; ￿￿(P ￿
t jt)] ￿ c
3. A￿
t 2 Et[e V jbatA￿
t; ￿￿(P ￿





t jt) = f￿￿
￿(Pjt)g￿2￿.
The ￿rst equilibrium condition states that informed traders maximize their expected pro￿t,
given the price schedule, trade by trade. Conditions (2) and (3) make market makers de-
termine the price schedule so that they expect zero pro￿ts from each trade. Evidently, in
the absence of exogenous transaction costs equilibrium bid and ask prices are equal to the
expectation of e V conditional, respectively, on a sell and on a buy order. The last condition
says that at the equilibrium the market makers’ buy price must be lower than (or equal to)
the sell price.
We now o￿er a useful characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the informed traders’
optimal strategy, and then prove the existence and the uniqueness of zero-pro￿t equilibrium
prices.
Informed traders are pro￿t-maximizing agents. Hence, for any price schedule P = fB; Ag
such that B ￿ A, an informed trader places a sell order when his expected asset value is
lower than the bid price, and places a buy order when it is higher. When the bid and ask
prices straddle his valuation, he will not trade. Finally, if his expected value is equal to the
bid or to the ask price, he is indi￿erent between all mixed strategies de￿ned on the simplex
￿(s; r) in the ￿rst case or on the simplex ￿(b; r) in the second.
6The valuation of the asset for informed traders depends on their information set, which
includes both the whole history of trades and the private signal. From the maximum like-
lihood ratio property of signals, the expected value for traders observing signal ￿i is higher
than that for those observing ￿j for any j < i. So, if it is pro￿table for traders with signal
￿n to sell when the price schedule is P, then also all traders observing signals ￿n+i, with
i 2 f1;2;:::;N ￿ ng, optimally prefer to sell. Similarly, if the traders getting signal ￿n prefer
to buy, then so do all traders getting signals ￿n￿j, with j 2 f1;2;:::;n ￿ 1g. Proposition 1
resumes this result.
Proposition 1 If ￿￿
￿n;s(Pjt) 6= 0, then ￿￿
￿n+i;s(Pjt) = 1 for any i 2 f1;2;:::;N ￿ ng. If
￿￿
￿n;b(Pjt) 6= 0, then ￿￿
￿n￿j;b(Pjt) = 1 for any j 2 f1;2;:::;n ￿ 1g.
Proposition 1 implies that a sell order generally indicates V because the probability of its
occurrence is greater in the bad state of nature, while a buy order generally indicates V . To
see this, note that the proposition implies that the likelihood ratio of a sell order at t, given
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￿











3 is the probability that the order comes from a liquidity trader, and ￿ns
t(B) and ￿nb
t(A)
are respectively the signals of marginal selling and buying traders. 16 Since
PN
i=n Pt(￿ijV ) ￿ PN
i=n Pt(￿ijV ) for all n = 1; 2;:::;N, the probability of a sell order is higher in the bad state
of nature and, since
Pn
i=1 Pt(￿ijV ) ￿
Pn
i=1 Pt(￿ijV ) for all n = 1; 2;:::;N, the probability
of a buy order is higher in the good state.
Another important implication of Proposition 1 is that if equilibrium bid and ask prices
exist, then they straddle the unconditional expected asset value, which is the price that
would prevail in the absence of adverse selection and ￿xed transaction costs. Indeed, since
￿s
t(B) ￿ 1 and ￿b
t(A) ￿ 1 for all t and P, the expected value conditional on a sell order never









t(A)] ￿ A and Et[e V j￿nb
t(A)+1)] < A:
For simplicity, here we suppose that the marginal traders choose to place an order also if
they are indi￿erent between trade and do not.
7exceeds the unconditional expectation, while the expected value conditional on a buy order
is never less than that expectation.
The next proposition states the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium bid and ask
prices.




4 Informational cascades with costly market-making
In this section we study the occurrence of informational cascades in the market equilibrium
just described.
If all informed traders make the same choice regardless of their private signal, no new
information reaches the market. Hence, during an informational cascade, the market equilib-
rium is such that: ￿￿
￿(P ￿
t jt) = ￿￿(P ￿
t jt) for all ￿ 2 ￿, and B￿
t = Et[e V ]￿c and A￿
t = Et[e V ]+c





It is straightforward to see that in equilibrium traders observing a bad signal never buy
and those getting a good signal never sell. Indeed, the valuation of traders with bad news
is always lower than the unconditional expected value, while that of traders with good news
is always higher. As we have seen, by Proposition 1 the unconditional expected value is the
upper bound of the equilibrium bid price and the lower bound of the equilibrium ask price.
Therefore, traders with a bad signal will never ￿nd it worthwhile to buy, while those with
a good signal will never place a sell order. This implies that in the market equilibrium an
informational cascade in which all informed traders place the same type of order will never
occur.
Nevertheless, an informational cascade can still occur if all informed traders abstain from
trading, since also in this case they behave identically. This may occur if market-making
has a cost. The intuition is the following. Transaction costs induce wider bid-ask spreads,
but the expectation of market makers and that of informed traders converge as the number
of transactions increases. 17 Hence, there would be a moment at which the informational
advantage is so small relative to the exogenous transaction cost that it is no longer pro￿table
for any informed trader to place an order.
A no-trade informational cascade starts if Et[e V j￿] 2 (B￿
t; A￿
t) for any ￿ 2 ￿. Clearly, if an
informational cascade occurs, the orders have no information content and then B￿
t = Et[e V ]￿c
and A￿
t = Et[e V ] + c.
The next proposition speci￿es a necessary and su￿cient condition for the occurrence of
informational cascades in market equilibrium.
17See Glosten and Milgrom [12].
8Proposition 3 B￿
t = Et[e V ] ￿ c if, and only if:
Et[e V ] ￿ Et[e V j￿N] ￿ c
and A￿
t = Et[e V ] + c if, and only if:
Et[e V j￿1] ￿ Et[e V ] ￿ c:
Proposition 3 states that the equilibrium bid price is equal to the public belief about the
fundamental value less the transaction cost c if and only if the informational advantage of
the traders with the most informative bad signal ￿N is smaller than the ￿xed transaction
cost. Symmetrically, the equilibrium ask price is equal to the public belief plus c if and only
if the informational advantage of traders endowed with the most informative good signal ￿1
is smaller than the ￿xed transaction cost.
The belief about the asset value of traders getting bad signals less informative than ￿N,
exceeds that of traders observing ￿N. This means that:
Et[e V ] ￿ Et[e V j￿N] ￿ c =) Et[e V ] ￿ Et[e V j￿] ￿ c
for all bad signals ￿ 2 ￿. Likewise, the belief of traders with good signals less informative
than ￿1 is lower than that of traders who observe it. This means that:
Et[e V j￿1] ￿ Et[e V ] ￿ c =) Et[e V j￿] ￿ Et[e V ] ￿ c
for all good signals ￿ 2 ￿. If the informational advantage of all traders is lower than the
transaction cost, no informed trader will place a order. Since all traders observing a private
signal act alike, no new information reaches the market and an informational cascade is
triggered.
It is straightforward that until the uncertainty is resolved, the informational advantage of
informed traders is strictly positive. As a consequence, in the absence of exogenous transac-
tion costs, an informational cascade would never occur. On the other hand, if for any possible
history of trades the transaction cost is greater than the advantage of informed traders, then
orders will never be information-based. This last property is stated in the following lemma.






￿1 ￿(V ￿V ) such that, if c > c, in equilibrium
all informed traders refrain from trading regardless of trading history.
Since the threshold cost c is increasing in the information content of the best private











￿￿1 < 1 < ￿￿N
h￿i(￿) = jE[e V j ￿; ￿i] ￿ E[e V j ￿]j; i = 1; N
Figure 1: Informational cascades in a market with ￿xed transaction costs.
traders will be more likely to refrain from trading, so price changes will not re￿ect information
about the fundamental.
The next proposition establishes that when transaction costs are lower than the threshold
cost, an informational cascade occurs as the public belief approaches the extremes of the
distribution of the true asset value.




￿N, such that when
￿ 2 [0; ￿l
￿1) [ (￿u
￿N; 1] all informed traders refrain from trading in equilibrium.
If the transaction cost does not exceed c, there exist a lower bound ￿l
￿1 and an upper bound
￿u
￿N of public beliefs such that if the unconditional expected value is lower than E[e V j￿l
￿1] or
higher than E[e V j ￿u
￿N], then no informed trader prefers to trade.
This result is a consequence of the convergence of beliefs. To see this, consider the following
example. Suppose that at t = 0 the unconditional expected asset value E[e V j￿0] is such that
at least the traders getting signals ￿1 and ￿N choose to trade (see ￿gure 1). Suppose also that
at t = 1;2;:::;T a sequence of buy orders arrives. Because of the new information that reaches
the market, the public belief about the asset value moves toward V . Hence the bid and ask
prices rise, and so does the valuation of informed traders. If public belief rises enough ( ￿
exceeds ￿u
￿1), the informational advantage of traders with signal ￿1 becomes so small that it is
no longer worthwhile for them to buy. Moreover, at the beginning of the arrival process the
expected pro￿t of traders getting signal ￿N increases because the bid price rises. Nevertheless,
if the buy orders are very numerous, the expected pro￿t from selling begins to fall o￿ and
eventually turns negative, because the traders’ evaluation depends both on the history of
trades and on their private signal. When the public belief converges to 1 or to 0, the weight
10of the information inferred from the history of trades increases and that of private information
decreases. Then, if enough buy orders are placed and the unconditional expected value goes
above E[e V j￿u
￿N], no informed trader will sell even though the bid price is very high. At that
point, an informational cascade occurs. An analogous argument demonstrates the occurrence
of an informational cascade when the public belief tends to V .
The previous example emphasizes that an informational cascade develops because the in-
formed traders’expectation depends not only on their private information but also on the
market history. But the weight of market history in the updating of informed traders’ expec-
tations also depends on the sharpness of their private signal. If there are perfectly informed
traders, an informational cascade never occurs. Indeed, if signals ￿N and ￿1 are perfectly
informative (that is, P(￿NjV ) = P(￿1jV ) = 0) the expected asset value conditional on those
signals does not depend on the history of trades. As a consequence, the pro￿t upon sale of a
trader observing ￿N increases when the public belief tends to V because of the price e￿ect.
Similarly, the expected pro￿t from buying of traders getting ￿1 increases when the public
belief tends to V .
In the following we show that if transaction costs are high enough, an informational cascade
may start even when the market is totally uncertain over the true value, that is, when ￿ is
close to 1
2.
Notice that, when the market assigns higher probability to the high value, the informa-
tional advantage of traders getting a good signal is greater than that of traders getting an
equally informative bad signal; in the opposite case, it is smaller. Moreover, if signals are
symmetrical, when the market is totally uncertain about the true value, the informational
advantage of the traders getting signal ￿1 is equal to that of the traders observing ￿N.
Let be c ￿ E[e V j ￿ = 1
2; ￿1]￿E[e V j ￿ = 1
2]. Proposition 5 establishes that if the ￿xed trans-
action cost exceeds c, there exists a neighborhood of E[e V j ￿ = 1
2] such that an informational
cascade occurs also if the unconditional expected asset value is within this neighborhood.






￿N) such that an
informational cascade occurs when ￿ 2 (￿u
￿1; ￿l
￿N).
To understand intuitively why cascades can occur under the conditions described in Propo-
sition 5, consider the following argument.
High transaction costs require large informational advantages to induce informed traders
to enter the market. If ￿ < 1
2, both the signal ￿N and the public belief indicate that the true
value is V . Hence, when the market assigns greater probability to the low value, the bad signal
￿N is \worth" less than the good signal ￿1, which contradicts the public belief. By the same
argument, when ￿ > 1
2, ￿1 is \worth" less then ￿N. This implies that if the transaction cost is
greater then c, no trader with a bad signal chooses to sell when Et[e V ] <
V ￿V
2 , and no trader
observing a good signal chooses to buy when Et[e V ] >
V ￿V
2 (see ￿gure 2). As a consequence,









Figure 2: Informational cascades in a market with high ￿xed transaction costs.
uninformative when prices are high. And, if Et[e V ] is in the interval (E[e V j￿u
￿1]; E[e V j￿l
￿N]),
no informed trader places an order and there is an informational cascade. Therefore, if
transaction costs are high enough, an informational cascade may develop even when the
public belief is not concentrated on V or V . This result contrasts with the typical ￿nding of
the literature, namely that cascades occur when there is convergence of beliefs.
5 Information content of orders and ￿xed transaction costs
In this section we analyze the e￿ect of transaction costs on the information content of or-
ders in equilibrium. First, we prove that in the absence of exogenous transaction costs the
competitive price mechanism produces equilibrium bid and ask prices that maximize the
information content of orders. Then we show that transaction costs reduce the amount of
information that the market can infer from both buy and sell orders.
An order’s information content is related to its likelihood ratio. An order is totally unin-
formative about the true value of the asset if and only if the likelihood ratio is equal to 1;
the more the ratio di￿ers from 1, the more informative the order. More speci￿cally, a sell
order is more informative when the likelihood ratio is higher, a buy order when it is lower.
So we can de￿ne the information content of a sell order as that order’s likelihood ratio and
that of a buy order as the reciprocal of its likelihood ratio.
The likelihood ratio of an order depends on the set of informed traders who prefer to place
the order. From Proposition 1 we know that, given the price schedule P = fB; Ag, the set
of informed traders who sell the asset is ￿ s
t(B) = f￿n 2 ￿ : n ￿ ns
t(B)g and the set of those
who buy is ￿b
t(A) = f￿n 2 ￿ : n ￿ nb
t(A)g, with ns
t(B) and nb
t(A) being the signals of the
marginal selling and buying traders, respectively.
If the set of buying (selling) traders is very numerous but also includes many traders with
12very noisy signals, that is, ￿nb
t(A) (￿ns
t(B)) near to 1, the information content of a buy (sell)
order is low. However, the information content of an order may be low even when the set of
active informed traders includes only a few traders observing very accurate signals.
Lemma 2 establishes that there exists a set of selling traders, ￿ ns = f￿n 2 ￿ : n ￿ nsg,
and a set of buying traders, ￿ nb = f￿n 2 ￿ : n ￿ nbg, that maximize the information content
of sell and buy orders, and that these sets do not depend on the public belief.
Lemma 2 There exist a bad signal ￿ns and a good signal ￿nb such that, for all trading histories:
￿ the information content of a sell order is maximum if ns
t(B) = ns;
￿ the information content of a buy order is maximum if nb
t(A) = nb.
A price schedule P = fB; Ag maximizes the information content of orders at t if it
prompts these two sets of traders to place orders at t, that is, ￿s
t(B) = ￿ns and ￿b
t(A) =
￿nb. Proposition 6 states that in the absence of ￿xed transaction costs, perfect competition
among market makers leads to equilibrium bid and ask prices such that ￿ s
t(B￿
t) = ￿ns and
￿b
t(A￿
t) = ￿nb for all trading histories.
Proposition 6 If c = 0, the equilibrium bid and ask prices, B￿
t and A￿





t) = ￿nb 8 t.
To gain an intuitive understanding of this result, denote by Et[e V j￿nb] the expected asset
value conditional on a buy order, when the set of informed buying traders is ￿ nb.
In the absence of exogenous transaction costs, the market makers’ expected pro￿t from
selling is given by the di￿erence between the ask price and their conditional expectation.
Bertrand competition between market makers implies that, in equilibrium, this di￿erence is
equal to zero.
Traders observing ￿nb refrain from trading when the ask price is greater than Et[e V j￿nb].
But if A > Et[e V j￿nb], the market makers’ expected pro￿t from selling is positive because
Et[e V jbatA] ￿ Et[e V j￿nb] ￿ Et[e V j￿nb] 8 A, by the de￿nition of ￿nb. Hence, the equilibrium
ask price cannot be greater than Et[e V j￿nb] and the set of informed buying traders includes
￿nb.
On the other hand, if traders observing good signals less informative than ￿nb buy the
asset, i.e. A < Et[e V j￿(nb+i)], the information that market makers can infer from a buy order
is more accurate than the signal ￿(nb+i). This implies that Et[e V jbatA] is higher than the
valuation of marginal traders, hence market makers’ expected pro￿t from selling is negative.




13The results of Proposition 6 suggest that in an asset market with a competitive price
mechanism, if adverse selection is the only source of the bid-ask spread, then in equilibrium
the information content of both sell and buy orders is always at its maximum.
With costly market-making, the equilibrium bid price is lower than the conditional ex-
pectation of the value given a sell order, and the equilibrium ask price is greater than the
conditional expectation of the asset value, given a buy order. As a consequence, transaction
costs reduce the information content of both types order, for any given history of trades.
An implication of Proposition 6 is that in the absence of transaction costs, the set of
informed traders who are active in the market does not depend on the trading history and
is constant over time. As a result, the probability of an order, conditional on the true asset
value, is the same at all t. If we consider the expected trading volume as the occurrence
probability of an order, Proposition 6 suggests that, in equilibrium, the expected trading
volume is constant over time and does not depend on the public belief about the true value
of the asset.
This result does not extend to a market with exogenous transaction costs. During an
informational cascade, no order comes from informed traders and the expected volume is
equal to the probability of a liquidity trader’s being selected to trade and placing an order.
Moreover, before an informational cascade starts, the expected volume gradually decreases
because the traders getting less informative signals refrain from trading. To show this,
suppose that at t = 0 traders getting signal ￿n choose to buy, that is:
E0[e V j￿n] ￿ A
￿
0 > 0:
Suppose, then, that there is a sequence of buy orders. The informational advantage of the
traders getting signal ￿n decreases as the public belief about the asset value approaches V .
And, it turns negative before ￿ gets larger than ￿u
￿1 because traders observing ￿n have a
lower valuation than those observing ￿1. Because the ask price exceeds the unconditional
expectation of the asset value, the traders getting signal ￿n refrain from trading before an
informational cascade starts. Therefore, the probability of an order is not constant over
time. We conclude that with exogenous transaction costs volume decreases as the public
belief approaches V or V , while it is positively correlated with the bid-ask spread. Moreover,
since the di￿erence between the equilibrium prices with and without transaction costs is
increasing in c, when transaction costs are higher, orders convey less information. This
suggests that price volatility should decrease as c increases.
To conclude this section, note that the e￿ect of transaction costs on the speed of conver-
gence to a cascade is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in c implies higher ￿l
￿1 and
lower ￿u
￿N, which should obviously speed up convergence. But, an increase in c also involves
lower information content of orders, slowing convergence down. Thus, the sign of the ￿nal
e￿ect of an increase of transaction costs on the speed of convergence to a cascade depends
on which of these two e￿ects prevails.
146 Proportional transaction costs
Let us now examine informational cascades when the market makers sustain a transaction cost
proportional to the price of the asset. The only di￿erence from the framework of the previous
sections is the expected pro￿t of the market maker: this is now equal to Et[e V jsatB]￿(1+c)B
if he buys at B, and to (1 ￿ c)A ￿ Et[e V jbatA] if he sells at A.
Perfect competition gives market makers zero expected pro￿t on either side of the market.
Hence, the equilibrium price schedule, P ￿
t = fB￿
t; A￿

















Since equilibrium bid and ask prices straddle the unconditional value expectation, in
equilibrium traders with a bad signal will never buy, those with a good signal will never
sell. Then, as before, in equilibrium there will never be informational cascades in which all
informed traders place the same type of order. However, the price schedule may be such that








The optimal correspondence strategies of informed traders do not change if transaction
costs are proportional rather than ￿xed. Thus, no informed trader wishes to sell when the
bid price is lower than the valuation of traders observing signal ￿N, i.e. Et[e V j￿N] > Bt.
Symmetrically, none wishes to buy when the ask price is higher than the valuation of traders
observing signal ￿1, i.e. Et[e V j￿1] < At. Proposition 7 now states that an informational cas-
cade will occur in equilibrium if and only if the informational advantage of the traders getting
the most informative good and bad signals is lower than the transaction cost multiplied by




1+c if, and only if:




1￿c if, and only if:
Et[e V j￿1] ￿ Et[e V ] ￿ c ￿ Et[e V j￿1]:
To gain an insight into this proposition, consider the ask side of the market and denote by
C(A) ￿ cA the cost to the market maker of selling the asset at the price A. In equilibrium,
when the set of informed buyers is non-empty, A￿ ￿ E[e V j￿1] and then C(A￿) ￿ c ￿ E[e V j￿1].
15This signals that c ￿ E[e V j￿1] represents the upper bound of the cost to the market maker of
selling the asset in the market equilibrium. So the traders getting signal ￿1 will buy the asset
as long as their informational advantage exceeds c￿E[e V j￿1]. On the other hand, if the public
belief is such that E[e V j￿1]￿E[e V ] ￿ c ￿ E[e V j￿1], then in equilibrium informed traders do not
trade, because their expectations are below
E[e V ]
1￿c , which is the lower bound of equilibrium ask
prices.
The total cost to the market maker of selling or buying now depends on price. Higher
bid and ask prices produce higher transaction costs, so their e￿ect on social learning should
be greater when the probability that the market assigns to V is high and should depend on
the magnitude of V and V . In particular, if the low asset value is zero, transaction costs
vanish as ￿ converges to 0. Hence, the two cases, V > 0 and V = 0, should be considered
separately. First consider V > 0. As in the previous framework, excessively high transaction
costs can inhibit informed traders from trading regardless of public beliefs. In particular if c
is always greater than the relative informational advantages of both traders getting ￿N and
traders getting ￿1, that is, if:
c ￿ supf
E[e V j￿] ￿ E[e V j￿; ￿N]
E[e V j￿; ￿N]
;
E[e V j￿; ￿1] ￿ E[e V j￿]
E[e V j￿; ￿1]
g
for all ￿ 2 [0; 1], then in equilibrium orders will never be information-based.






￿NV )2 ￿ (￿N ￿ 1) such that, if c > cp, in
equilibrium all informed traders refrain from trading, regardless of the history of trades.
Proposition 3 states that if the low asset value is strictly positive and the proportional
transaction cost does not exceed cp, an informational cascade develops both when the public
belief about the asset value tends to V and when it approaches V . Also, if the transaction
costs are high enough and if the bid-ask spreads are not too large, an informational cascade
may also occur when the probabilities that the market assigns to V and to V are not far
apart.
Proposition 8 If c 2 (0;cp) and if V is strictly positive, there exist unique ￿ and ￿, with
￿ < ￿, such that when ￿ 2 [0; ￿) [ (￿; 1] all informed traders refrain from trading in






V is greater than ￿1, there
exist ￿ 2 (￿;
V
V +V ) and ￿ 2 (
V
V +V ; ￿) such that an informational cascade occurs also when











Ci(￿) = c ￿ E[e V j ￿; ￿i]; i = 1; N
Figure 3: Informational cascades in a market with proportional transaction costs and
V
V < ￿1.
Informed traders ￿nd it pro￿table to trade as long as their informational advantage is
greater than the transaction costs. The informational advantage decreases both when ￿
approaches 0 and when it tends to 1, and when ￿ is exactly equal to 0 or 1, it is nil.
The transaction costs are an increasing function of the public belief and are always strictly
positive if V is greater than zero. As a result, the transaction cost exceeds the informational
advantage of informed traders so a cascade occurs both when the public belief about the
asset value is close to V and when it is near to V (see ￿gure 3).
What is more, when the proportional transaction cost is high, an informational cascade
can take place even without the convergence of beliefs. However, di￿erently from the case of
￿xed costs, with proportional costs a cascade can occur when ￿ is near 1
2 only if the cost to
the market maker when buying is not too much smaller than the cost when selling; that is,
if
V
V > ￿1 (see ￿gure 4).
If V is close to zero, the transaction costs are very small when the market assigns a high
probability to the low asset value. Then, the probability of an informational cascade with
low prices declines as V approaches 0, and in the extreme case of V = 0, it falls to zero. This
result is stated in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 If c 2 (0; cp) and if V = 0, there exists unique ￿ such that if and only if ￿ > ￿,
all informed traders refrain from trading in equilibrium.
Intuitively, the transaction cost of the market maker decreases as ￿ tends to zero and










￿ ￿ ￿ ￿












Figure 5: Informational cascades in a market with proportional transaction costs and V = 0.
18vanish when ￿ = 0 (see ￿gure 5). As a consequence, an informational cascade will never
occur when equilibrium prices are low.
This ￿nding carries the interesting implication that cascades tend to be asymmetrical. In
depressed markets, they will almost never occur while they are more likely to be present in
bull markets. As a consequence, cascades are more likely to trigger a market crash than a
buying surge.
7 Concluding remarks and extensions
We have presented a model of the e￿ect of costly market-making on the informational e￿-
ciency of prices in an asset market characterized by asymmetric information and sequential
trading, examining the impact of both ￿xed and proportional transaction costs on price
discovery.
Standard microstructure models show that in the short run trading frictions may decouple
market prices from fundamentals, but assume that prices ultimately converge to fundamental
values (Glosten and Milgrom [12], Kyle [15]). Models of informational cascades question this
conclusion, by showing that the deviations can be persistent, because there are circumstances
where markets may stop impounding fundamental information in prices. One of these cir-
cumstances is precisely the presence of trading frictions, as shown by Lee [16], who considers
￿xed transaction costs in a framework of asymmetric information and sequential trading.
The limitation of Lee’s model however is that it does not allow for optimizing behavior by
market makers as normally done in microstructure models, so that the question arises if
informational cascades can still arise when this assumption is made.
This paper answers this question. When market makers are assumed to behave optimally
and competitively in setting prices, informational cascades can still occur in equilibrium.
Moreover, transaction costs may allow a cascade not only when the market assigns a high
probability to the high or to the low value of the asset, so that prices are either very high or
very low, as in Lee [16], but even when there is uncertainty about the fundamental value.
The paper also studies what happens if transaction costs are proportional to asset prices,
rather than ￿xed. The main novel ￿nding is that in this case the probability of an informa-
tional cascade is greater when prices are high. Speci￿cally, if the fundamental value in the
bad state approximates zero, an informational cascade will never occur when the price is low.
This implies that when transaction costs depend on prices, cascades are asymmetrical: they
are rare in depressed markets, and more likely to develop in bull markets.
Recent work on informational cascades in ￿nancial markets seeks to explain bubbles and
crashes (Avery and Zemsky [2], Dasgupta and Prat [7], Lee [16]). These empirical phenomena
generally come with increasing trading volume. However, like Lee [16], we ￿nd that as the
market tends to an informational cascade, the expected volume of trading decreases because
informed traders stay on the sidelines. The model assumes that liquidity traders submit
orders in a probabilistic way according to a stationary distribution. This is a very strong
assumption. In reality, if liquidity traders have any discretion as to the timing of their orders,
19one should expect their trading to be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread. 18 Since
the bid-ask spread tends to decrease before and during informational cascades, due to the
reduction of informed trading, we should ￿nd an increase in liquidity trading before and
during cascades, when the adverse selection component of the spread disappears. In a such
a setting, informational cascades should involve a change in the composition of total volume
in favor of liquidity trading. And, if liquidity traders are more numerous, total expected
volume could actually increase during a cascade. A natural extension of this paper would be
to investigate the empirical implications of informational cascades in ￿nancial markets with
discretionary liquidity traders.
8 Appendix
Lemma 4 The marginal selling trader increases the information content of a sell order if, and only if:
￿ ￿￿ns
t (B) > ￿s
t(B).














i=1 P(￿ijV ). To prove the lemma for the ask side, we have to show that:
fb(n) ￿ fb(n ￿ 1) () ￿n ￿ fb(n):
By using algebraic calculus, it is easy to show that:
1. fb(n) ￿ fb(n ￿ 1) () ￿n ￿ fb(n ￿ 1)
2. ￿n ￿ fb(n ￿ 1) () ￿n ￿ fb(n).
By combining these results, we obtain:
fb(n) ￿ fb(n ￿ 1) () ￿n ￿ fb(n):
Since fb(nb
t(A)) = ￿b
t(A), the lemma for the ask side is proved. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the proposition for the ask price. The proof for the bid price is by symmetrical argument.
18Admati and P￿eiderer [1] analyze the volume and price variability in a model where discretionary liquidity traders time
their trades to minimize transaction costs.
20By the monotone likelihood property of signals, the expected asset value conditional on a buy order is
always greater than (or equal to) the unconditional expected value. This implies that if the ask price is lower
than E[yjH]+c, the market maker’s expected pro￿t is negative. Moreover, E[yjH, b at A] is upper-bounded
by V . Hence, by the zero-expected-pro￿t condition, the equilibrium ask price cannot be greater than V + c.
Let us de￿ne the correspondence F b
t : [Et[e V ] + c; V + c] ; [Et[e V ] + c; V + c] as:
F b
t (A) ￿ Et[e V jb at A] + c
F b
t (A) is an upper semicontinuous convex-valued correspondence that maps the set [ Et[e V ] + c; V + c]
onto itself. By Kakutani’s ￿xed point theorem, F b
t (A) has a ￿xed point A
￿
t; that is, an equilibrium ask price
always exists.
Uniqueness is proved using the results of Lemma 4, which states that the marginal buying (selling) trader
increases the information content of a buy (sell) order. That is, the likelihood ratio of the buy (sell) order
increases (decreases) when the marginal buyer (seller) refrains from trading, if the signal that he observes is
more accurate than the information that the market maker infers from a buy (sell) order.
Suppose, by way of obtaining a contradiction, that there exist two equilibrium ask prices: A1 and A2,
with A1 < A2. Denote nb
t(A1) and nb
t(A2) respectively the marginal buying trader given A1 and the marginal
buying trader given A2. Clearly, since we suppose A1 < A2, it must be that ￿nb
t(A1) > ￿nb
t(A2). First, note that
at the equilibrium, the value assessment of the marginal buying trader is greater than (or at most equal to)
the market maker’s conditional expected value. Hence ￿nb
t(A1) ￿ ￿b
t(A1): This implies that ￿b
t(A1) < ￿b
t(A2)
because, when the ask price rises to A2, the traders getting the signal ￿nb
t(A1) refrain from trading, and then
the likelihood ratio of a buy order increases by lemma 4. As a consequence, if the ask price is equal to A2, the
market maker’s expected pro￿t is strictly positive. Hence, by the zero-expected-pro￿t condition, A2 cannot
be an equilibrium ask price. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the proposition for the ask price; the proof for the bid price is symmetrical. First we assume
that A￿
t = Et[e V ] + c and we prove that this implies Et[e V ] ￿ Et[e V j￿N] ￿ c. Suppose by way of obtaining
a contradiction that Et[e V j￿1] ￿ Et[e V ] > c. Since at least the traders observing ￿1 prefer to buy when the
ask price is Et[e V ] + c, the expected asset value conditional on a buy order at Et[e V ] + c is greater than the
unconditional expected asset value. This implies that the market maker’s expected pro￿t is negative, which
contradicts the fact that Et[e V ] + c is the equilibrium ask price.
On the other hand, if Et[e V j￿1]￿Et[e V ] ￿ c then no informed trader will buy. Hence inf fEt[e V jb at Et[e V ]+
c; ￿￿(P ￿
t jt)] + cg = Et[e V ] + c = A￿
t. 2
Proof of Lemma 1
De￿ne the functions h￿(￿) as:
h￿(￿) ￿ jEt[e V j￿] ￿ Et[e V ]j =
￿ ￿ ￿2
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ j1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ (V ￿ V ):
21h￿(￿) gives the informational advantage of traders observing ￿ for any ￿ 2 [0; 1]. Putting Proposition 3 and
the assumption of symmetrical signals together it follows that:







￿ (V ￿ V ):2
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the function h￿ de￿ned in the proof of lemma 1. Note that:







￿ ￿ (V ￿ V )
￿ h
00
￿(￿) = ￿ 2￿
(￿+(1￿￿)￿)3 ￿ j1 ￿ ￿ij ￿ (V ￿ V ) < 0 8￿ 2 [0; 1]:











￿, such that h￿(￿l
￿) = h￿(￿u
￿) = c and h￿(￿) > c if, and only if, ￿ 2 (￿l
￿; ￿u
￿).
Thus, when ￿ 2 (0; ￿l
￿) [ (￿u





















￿1 < argmax h￿1(￿) and ￿u




￿1. Hence, when either
￿ < ￿l
￿1 or ￿ > ￿u
￿N, all informed traders will refrain from trading. 2
Proof of Proposition 5




￿N such that h￿1(￿u
￿1) =
h￿N(￿l
￿N) = c. Since h
0
￿1(1
2) < 0 and h
0
￿N(1
2) > 0, and since
j1￿￿1j
2(1+￿1) ￿ (V ￿ V ) < c < c, then ￿u
￿1 < ￿l
￿N and
both c > h￿1(￿) and c > h￿N(￿) for any ￿ 2 [￿u
￿1; ￿l
￿N]. 2
Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the lemma for the ask side. The proof for the bid side is analogous.
A buy order indicates the good state of nature. Hence, the information content of a buy order is maximum
when fb(n) (de￿ned in the proof of lemma 4) reaches its minimum value. If all informed traders prefer to
buy the asset, then fb(N) = 1 < ￿N. By lemma 4, it follows that the marginal buying trader reduces
the information content of the buy order; that is: fb(N ￿ 1) < fb(N). If no informed trader buys, then
fb(0) = 1 > ￿1, and the marginal buying trader increases the information content of the buy order; that is:
fb(1) > fb(0). By the maximum likelihood property of signals, it follows that there exists a unique signal
￿nb such that:
fb(nb + 1) > fb(nb) ￿ ￿nb and f b(nb) ￿ fb(nb ￿ 1):
22If the equilibrium ask price A￿
t is such that nb
t(A￿
t) = nb, then the equilibrium information content of a buy
order is maximum. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
We prove the proposition for the ask side. The proof for the bid side can be obtained symmetrically.
Since c = 0, the competitive ask price has to be equal to the expected asset value conditional on a buy
order, that is:
A￿
t 2 Et[e V jb at A￿
t; ￿￿(P ￿
t jt)]:
Lemma 2 states that there exists a good signal ￿nb such that fb(nb) ￿ fb(n) for every n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng,
and ￿nb ￿ fb(nb). Moreover, by combining lemmas 4 and 2 it easy to see that ￿(nb+1) > fb(nb + 1). As a
consequence, for any history of trades:
Et[e V j￿nb+1] < V +
￿t
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)fb(nb + 1)
￿ (V ￿ V ) (3)
and
Et[e V j￿nb] ￿ V +
￿t
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)fb(nb)
￿ (V ￿ V ): (4)
3 and 4 imply that there exists an ask price A￿
t that belongs to (Et[e V j￿nb+1]; Et[e V j￿nb]] and that satis￿es
the market maker’s zero-pro￿t condition. By Proposition 2, we know that there exists a unique ask price
that satis￿es that condition. Thus, in equilibrium, nb
t(A￿
t) = nb. 2
Proof of Proposition 7




1￿c and prove that this implies
Et[e V j￿1]￿Et[e V ]
Et[e V j￿1] ￿ c. Suppose by way of obtaining a contradiction that
Et[e V j￿1]￿Et[e V ]
Et[e V j￿1] > c. This means that Et[e V j￿1] >
Et[e V ]
1￿c . Hence, at the least the traders observing ￿1 prefer to
buy when the ask price is
Et[e V ]
1￿c . As a consequence, the expected asset value conditional on a buy order at
Et[e V ]
1￿c is greater than the unconditional expected asset value. This implies that the market maker’s expected
pro￿t is negative, which contradicts the fact that
Et[e V ]
1￿c is the equilibrium ask price.
On the other hand, if
Et[e V j￿1]￿Et[e V ]
Et[e V j￿1] ￿ c then no informed trader buys.19Hence:
inff
Et[e V jb at
Et[e V ]








Proof of Lemma 3
De￿ne the functions g￿(￿) as:
g￿(￿) ￿




￿V + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿V
￿ j1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ (V ￿ V ):
19The relative informational advantage of informed traders increases with the signal’s precision.
23g￿(￿) gives the relative informational advantage of traders observing ￿ for any ￿ 2 [0; 1]. The relative
informational advantage of traders getting the signals ￿N and ￿1 is always greater than that of traders











￿ (￿N ￿ 1):2
Proof of Proposition 8
First we prove that there exist unique ￿ and ￿ such that when ￿ 2 [0; ￿)
S
(￿; 1], all informed traders
will refrain from trading.
Consider the function g￿(￿) de￿ned at page 23. Notice that:







￿￿V )2 ￿ j￿￿ ￿ 1j
￿ g
00
￿ (￿) = ￿
2￿￿V V
(￿V +(1￿￿)￿￿V )3 ￿ j1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ (V ￿ V ) < 0 8￿ 2 [0; 1]:
Since by assumption 0 < c ￿ cp, from the strict concavity of g￿(￿) it follows that there exist unique ￿￿
and ￿￿, with ￿￿ < ￿￿, such that g￿(￿￿) = g￿(￿￿) = c and g￿(￿) > c if, and only if, ￿ 2 (￿￿; ￿￿). Thus,
￿ = inff￿￿g￿2￿ and ￿ = supf￿￿g￿2￿.
In order to prove the second part of the theorem, note ￿rst that g￿1(
V
V +V ) = g￿N(
V
V +V ) = cp, and
g￿1(￿) < g￿N(￿) for all ￿ >
V
V +V . Moreover, if V > V ￿1 then
V
V +V < argmax g￿1(￿) < ￿￿1. As a
consequence, if V > V ￿1 then the relative informational advantage of traders getting ￿N is strictly positive
for all ￿ 2 [￿￿1; ￿￿N) whatever c 2 (0; cp). In contrast, if V < V ￿1 and c is greater than cp, then ￿￿1 is lower
than ￿￿N and both g￿1(￿) and g￿N(￿) are strictly negative for all ￿ 2 (￿￿1; ￿￿N). Hence an informational
cascade occurs also when ￿ 2 (￿￿1; ￿￿N). 2
Proof of Proposition 9
If V = 0, the relative informational advantage of traders getting the signal ￿ as a function of ￿ is given
by g￿(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ j￿￿ ￿ 1j. Since by assumption 0 < c ￿ cp, it follows that for any ￿ 2 ￿ there exists a
unique ￿￿ such that g￿(￿￿) = c, and g￿(￿) > c if, and only if, ￿ < ￿￿. Thus, ￿ = supf￿￿g￿2￿. 2
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